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IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 17619 
JAHES E. BALLENBERGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, James Ballenberger, appeals from a 
conviction of second degree felony theft in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This criminal action was brought by the State of Utah 
against James E. Ballenberger for second degree felony theft 
alleging that Mr. Ballenberger exercised unauthorized control 
over the property of R. C. Ashby on May 15, 1980. 
On March 5, 1981, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
, Defendant Ballenberger moved to suppress certain evidence on the 
ground that it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest. The 
motion to suppress the evidence was denied. 
The case was then tried before a jury, the Honorable Jay 
E. Banks presiding which convicted Defendant Ballenberger of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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offense of theft, a second degree felony. He was thereafter 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison on March 5, 1981 for a ten, 
of 1 to 15 years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the jury verdict, and the sentence 
imposed pursuant thereto, be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on May 15, 1980, Officer 
LeVitre, of the Murray City Police Department, observed James:. 
Ballenberger and Lynn Fulton in an automobile coming toward hie 
on the Hyland Dairy access road, approximately 5400 South 9th 
East (Tr. 25-29). The vehicle in which Hr. Ballenberger was 
riding made a sharp turn into the Oakwood Village Shopping 
Center (Tr. 27). However, the car did not swerve nor did the 
tires screech (Tr. 29-30). Officer LeVitre observed the vehicl 
until he decided that it was not going through the Oakwood 
storage area (Tr. 31-32). Officer LeVitre then proceeded 
through the Oakwood Village Shopping storage area (Tr. 31). 
Officer LeVitre located Mr. Ballenberger' s car in a wel 
lighted area of the Oakwood Village Shopping Center (Tr. 36). 
Noticing the raised hood (Tr. 32), Officer LeVitre then as~d 
Mr. Ballenberger what he was doing, to which he explained he Wi 
merely checking the oil (Tr. 33, 34). Officer LeVitre then 
- 2 -
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stepped from his patrol car and asked for identification (Tr. 
34) . 
LeVitre testified that he observed a CB radio, an 
antenna and some stereo head phones in the back seat of the 
vehicle (Tr. 36). He asked Mr. Ballenberger "about the 
property in the back seat" (Tr. 35), but Mr. Ballenberger did 
not respond (Tr. 37). 
At that time Officer Hansen, responding to LeVitre's 
I call, arrived (Tr. 131). Officer Hansen took Mr. Ballenberger 
: I into his patrol car to question him while Officer LeVitre took 
Lynn Fulton, who was also riding in the vehicle with Mr. 
Ballenberger, into his car to be questioned (Tr. 131). In 
Officer Hansen's patrol car Mr. Ballenberger was first read the 
"Miranda warning" and then questioned about the property in the 
back seat of the vehicle (Tr. 38). Mr. Fulton was also 
:1'1 questioned in Mr. LeVitre' s car after receiving the Miranda 
warning from Officer LeVitre (Tr. 38). At this point no theft 
had been reported nor was there any indication that the property 
in the back seat was stolen. 
Following Fulton's interrogation, Officer LeVitre 
conversed briefly with Officer Hansen. Officer LeVitre then 
i:ook Mr. Fulton to 550 East 5300 South to observe a parked Van 
(Tr. 131, 132). Mr. Robbie Ashby, was located and returned to 
the Oakdale Village Shopping Center(Tr. 133). Mr. Ashby then 
identified the property in the back of Mr. Ballenberger's car 
- 3 -
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being his (Tr. 134). Mr. Ballenberger was required to wait 'i; 1 
Officer Hansen while Mr. Fulton traveled with Officer LeVitre 
some five blocks to awaken Mr. Ashby, question him and returr, 
the scene (Tr. 131-134). At that time Mr. Ballenberger and:h.! 
Fulton were formally placed under arrest (Tr. 134). 
The time sequence in which the foregoing took place'" [ 
I 
from approximately 3: 10 a. m., when the Ballenberger vehicle w0; i 
observed, to 3: 19 a.m., when the suspects were advised of thei:: 
rights, to 3: 40 a. m. when they were formally arrested (Tr, 8, ! 
134). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING 
EVIDENCE SEIZED SUBSEQUENT TO AN ILLEGAL ARREST 
A. At the time of the arrest, the officers did not hav:, 
I 
probable cause; therefore, the subsequent arrest was 
1 
illegal and any evidence obtained thereafter should~ 
suppressed. 
Generally, the moment at which an officer restrains th< 
freedom of an individual for more than a momentary questioning,! 
he has made an "arrest." An arrest does not require that the 
individual be taken to the station house and prosecuted for the 
crime. Nor does it require an officer formally pronouncing tha: 
an individual is arrested. In the landmark case of Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court outlined when an officer is 
- 4 -
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a: 
justified to "stop and frisk." The Court also cautioned that 
when an individual's freedom to walk away is limited, or when an 
individual is detained more than briefly, such detention 
elevates a "stop" to a full arrest. 
It must be recognized that whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. 
Id.,atl6. 
Although the differentiation between an allowable stop 
and an arrest is difficult to ascertain, whenever a person is 
restrained for more than a "momentary" period, Rio v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 253, 264 (1960), or "briefly," Terry v. Ohio, 
392U. S. 1, 10 (1968), therestraintmustbeviewedas an 
arrest. 
According to Officer LeVitre, he first stopped and 
questioned Mr. Ballenberger as to any possible automobile 
problems and as to the property within the automobile (Tr. 
32-35). Such momentary questioning is within the purview of the 
stop and frisk doctrine enunciated by Terry. However, once Mr. 
Ballenberger was ordered to step into Officer Hansen's car and 
then read the Miranda warning, he was involved in much more than 
a momentary questioning (Tr. 38). At that point it was 
inconceivable that Mr. Ballenberger felt he was at liberty to 
leave. In fact, it was clear that Officer Hansen required not 
only that Mr. Ballenberger submit to the questioning, but that 
he wait in his presence while Mr. Fulton traveled with Officer 
LeVitre some five blocks to awaken Mr. Ashby and question him 
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(Tr. 131-134). He also was required to await Mr. Ashby's 
arrival back to the scene where he was being detained. 
According to the two officer's estimate of this time lapse,:'.: 
Ballenberger was restrained for at least twenty minutes (Tr.:, 
134). This total control over Hr. Ballenberger amounted to mu:· 
more than momentary questioning; it represented an arrest not 
supported by probable cause. 
The circumstances under which Mr. Ballenberger was 
arrested is analogous to these in the case of People v. Miller 
496 P.2d 1228 (Cal. 1972). In that case defendant was fo~d 
sleeping in a car in a private lot. The investigating officer 
observed electronic equipment and a coat in the rear seat of::. 
vehicle. He later learned of an outstanding warrant on the 
defendant and arrested him. The officer asked the defendant 
whether he could take the coat and electronic equipment, butt: 
defendant refused permission. The officer then seized the gooc· 
and later found marijuana in the coat pocket of the defendant 
At the trial the defense sought to suppress the evidenc 
arguing that the officer did not have prob ab le cause to arrest 
the defendant. The court held that absent exigent 
circumstances, the mere fact that the defendant was found 
sleeping in a car in a private parking lot with electronic 
equipment in the back seat, did not amount to probable cause tc 
arrest the defendant for receiving stolen property. The court 
further held that the defendant's refusal to waive his Fourth 
- 6 -
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AQendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizure did 
not amount to "suspicious" activity evidencing criminal conduct. 
The court ruled that the officers lacked probable cause and that 
the evidence should therefore be excluded. The rationale of the 
~ case is applicable to the case at bar. 
In the Miller case the court found that the defendant 
sleeping in his car in a private parking lot did not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion. Likewise, in this case Mr. 
Ballenberger working underneath the hood of his car in a 
well-lighted area of a private parking lot does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
In the Miller case, the additional fact that electronic 
equipment happened to be in the back seat of the car in plain 
view did not amount to probable cause because there was no 
inference that the equipment was stolen. The court in that case 
stated: 
The additional fact that he happened to be 
carrying electronic equipment at the time would 
not, in itself, support an inference that the 
equipment was stolen, particularly since the 
police had not received any report of the theft 
of such material. Id., at 1232. 
The court reasoned that: 
Unless it is first established that the police 
officer believed that a crime . . . had been 
committed by the [defendants], the issue of 
probable cause does not arise, for it would be 
a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked 
to determine the reasonableness of an officer's 
belief that the particular crime had been 
committed unless it were first established that 
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the officer did entertain such a belief. Id., 
at 1233. 
In this case, at the time the police officers ordered 
Mr. Ballenberger into their patrol car, read him the Mir~~ 
warning and questioned him, there was no indication that the 
I 
property on the back seat was stolen. The officers only ~i 
that it was or might have been. Because there was no evidence i 
of a crime having been committed prior to the officers taking 
Mr. Ballenberger into custody, the officers obviously had no 
I 
probable cause for an arrest. Therefore, the evidence obtaine:! 
subsequent to the illegal arrest should have been suppressed. 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
I 
B. The officers did not have an articulable suspicion I 
to justify an investigatory detention, a stop, and 
therefore any evidence obtained thereafter should be 
suppressed. 
When Officer Ray LeVitre approached Mr. Ballenberger, 
any suspicions he might have had would only have been based on 
(1) the lateness of the hour and (2) the fact burglaries had I 
been reported in the area two days previous (Tr. 43, 48). Thesi: 
two factors, independently or in conjunction with each other, at 
not constitute sufficient grounds to justify an investigative 
stop. In People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979), an officer 
observed a white man, the defendant, late at night enter a 
- 8 -
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l 
predominantly black colllillunity noted for its high crime rate. 
The officer had never previously observed a white person enter 
this neighborhood at night and therefore when groups of blacks 
started mingling around the white individual, the officer became 
somewhat suspicious. The officer then approached the group and 
stopped and frisked the defendant. At trial the defendant 
claimed that the lateness of the hour combined with the high 
crime rate of the area were inadequate grounds to justify a 
detention, i.e. a stop and frisk. The court held that a white 
man entering a predominantly black residential area having 
"high" crime rate in the evening did not provide a sufficient 
basis for the officer's detention. 
In the case at bar, Officers LeVitre and Hansen relied 
solely on the lateness of the hour and the fact that crimes had 
been reported in the area previously to justify their action of 
detaining Mr. Ballenberger, contrary to People v. Bower, in 
which the "night-time" factor and a "high crime" area cannot 
justify a detention. Where such detention is not justifiable, a 
prolonged detention in an officer's patrol car where the 
arrestee has been read the Miranda warning, subjected to the 
interrogation of an officer and held there while his fellow 
companion is taken from the scene and later returned, is 
likewise not justifiable. 
Similarly, in Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1978), 
two young blacks were walking down the street during school 
- 9 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hours. The officer, knowing that the boys should have been, 
school and remembering that several burglaries perpetrated bv 
. I 
black youths had recently occurred in the area made an 1 
investigative stop and subsequently seized allegedly stolen 
property from the boys. At trial, counsel for the boys arguec 
that the officer had insufficient evidence to support a 
suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop or 
detention. The court held that circumstances known to the 
police officer did not support a reasonable suspicion that the 
minors were involved in criminal activity, thus the ensuing 
investigative stop was unlawful and the property seized was no: 
admissible. The court reasoned that even though the action oi 
the boys was somewhat suspicious in that they were on the strn 
at an hour when they probably should not have been, and even 
though several burglaries had occurred which were reportedly 1 
committed by black youths, much more is needed to reasonably 
suspect that a person is participating in a crime. The court 
found that certain factors must exist in order to justify an 
investigative stop or detention. The Court stated: 
The circumstances known or apparent to the 
officer must include specific and articulable 
facts causing him to suspect that (1) some 
activity relating to crime has taken place or 
is occurring or is about to occur, and (2) the 
person he intends to stop or detain is involved 
in that activity. Not only must he . 
subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it 
must also be objectively reasonable for him to 
do so: the facts must be such as would cause 
any reasonable police officer in a like 
position, drawing when appropriate on training 
- 10 -
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l 
and experience ... to suspect the same 
criminal activity and the same involvement by 
the person in question. Id., at 959. 
The court in Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978), held 
chat the officer could not articulate more than a mere suspicion 
and that a suspicion or a hunch did not justify an investigatory 
stop or an arrest. The court specifically stated that: 
. . . an investigative stop or detention predicated 
on mere curiosity, rumor or hunch is unlawful, even 
though the officer may be acting in complete good 
faith. Id., at 959. 
The facts of the Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 
1978), case are analogous to the circumstances in this case. 
\./hen Officers Levitre and Hansen approached Mr. Ballenberger, 
their justification for the original stop was the lateness of 
the hour and the fact that burglaries had previously occurred in 
the area. Under the rationale of either the Bower case or the 
~case, the lateness of the hour or the fact that the 
incident occurred after regular store hours is not sufficient 
ground to justify an investigatory stop. The Bower case 
specifically stated that the fact that the defendant was 
observed at night had little or no bearing to justify an 
articulable suspicion. The court underscored this by explaining 
that: 
No reasonable suggestion of criminality 
is added by the fact it was dark when the officer 
observed appellant. Strictly speaking, the "night-
time factor" is not activity by a citizen, and 
this court has warned that this factor "should be 
appraised with caution" ... and that it has at 
most, "minimal importance" in evaluating the 
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propriety of an intrusion ... People v. Bower, 
597 P.Zd 115 (Cal. 1979). 
Additionally, the fact that some criminal activity 'nJ. 
al; 
previously occurred in the area is not in and of itself groun, 
for suspicion. In the Tony C. case the fact that burglar~s 
occurred a few days earlier perpetrated by young blacks did 
rise to the level of an articulable suspicion when other youn[ 
blacks entered the area. Likewise, in the Bower case 
I 
the court specifically found that the officer's assertion that 1 
· 1 
I 
the incident occurred in a high crime area did not elevate the I 
I 
circumstances to a reasonable suspicion of criminality. In th:! 
case the court stated: \ 
Finally, the officer's assertion that the 
location lay in a "high crime" area does not 
elevate these facts into a reasonable suspicion 
of criminality. The "high crime" area factor is 
not an "activity" of an individual ... As a 
result, this court has appraised this factor with 
caution and has been reluctant to conclude that a 
location's crime rate transforms otherwise innocent· 
appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying 
the seizure of an individual. Id., at 119. 
Thus, under the Bower rationale, the fact that the Oakwood 
shopping area may have been the subject of criminal activity in 
the past, is not sufficient to make Mr. Ballenberger's presence\ 
there a reasonably suspicious activity. 
Moreover, the Oakwood Village Shopping Center was not 
even an area of high criminal activity. Officer LeVitre was 
merely alerted to the area by routine dispatches which two days 
1 
previous to the occurrence indicated that a break-in had 
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occurred in the Oakwood Village Shopping Center (Tr. 48). The 
routine report of the dispatcher indicating a break-in does not 
elevate the Oakwood Village Shopping Center to a "high crime" 
area. Mr. Ballengerger' s mere presence at the Oakwood Village 
shopping area was not sufficient to amount to an articulable 
suspicion in light of his innocent activity engaged in there. 
Neither does his failure to answer concerning the 
property in the back of the car in which he was riding elevate 
his behavior to that which is reasonably suspicious. A person' s 
mere refusal to waive a Fourth Amendment right may not be 
transformed into "suspicious" activity evidencing criminal 
conduct. "The courts have, of course, condemned any state 
practice which imposes adverse treatment on individuals for 
exercising constitutional rights intended to protect against 
such adversity," People v. Miller, 496 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Cal. 
1972). 
Therefore, at the time Officers LeVitre and Hansen 
approached Mr. Ballenberger, read him the Miranda warning and 
questioned him in their police vehicle, the officers were 
without any articulable suspicion. At that time the goods had 
!'.£.!been identified as stolen property, and the only support the 
officers had for their belief that Mr. Ballenberger might have 
been engaged in a criminal activity was the lateness of the hour 
and the area in which he was found. Under the circumstances 
neither of these two factors would justify an investigatory 
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detention. Accordingly, the evidence obtained subsequent to 
investigatory detention should have been suppressed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE WHERE THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED STOLEN 
PROPERTY WAS WITHOUT A WARRANT AND ABSENT EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a 
warrantless search is not justified by probably cause in the 
absence of exigent circumstances. In Coolidge v. New Hampshi:, 
403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court specifically stated: 
[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a 
warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent 
circumstances," Id., at 468. 
In this instance there were no exigent circumstances , 
which required a seizure without a warrant. Sometime after }tr 
Ballenberger and Mr. Fulton had been taken into custody, the co 
in which they were riding was towed to the Murray Police Static 
(Tr. 39). While the car was at the Police Station, the proper: 
was seized without a search warrant (Tr. 39). In his testimon> 
Officer LeVitre stated that there was no danger of losing t~ 
property but that a warrant was not obtained simply because th,, 
property had been identified by the victim (Tr. 39). Under the 
holding of the Coolidge case, Officer LeVitre was not justilW 
in seizing the property before obtaining a warrant from an 
impartial magistrate. The fact that the car was at the police 
- 14 -
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department, combined with the fact that the property had been 
identified by the victim was not sufficient to allow Officer 
LeVitre or any other officer to search the vehicle and to seize 
the property contained within. Accordingly, evidence obtained 
by the warrantless seizure should have been suppressed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGE WHEN PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRODUCE MATERIAL 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE 
OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN. 
A. Defendant's right of confrontation was violated by 
the failure of the prosecution to physically admit into 
evidence all the property that was allegedly stolen. 
The main purpose for the right of confrontation is to 
secure the opportunity of cross-examination, Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400 ( 1965) . In interpreting this right, this Court has 
long held that a defendant may not be convicted unless he has 
the opportunity of confronting and cross-examining the witnesses 
against him, State v. Mannion, 57 P. 542 (Utah 1899). The right 
of confrontation not only affords an opportunity to 
cross-examine, but also enables the jury to observe the demeanor 
of the witnesses for the state, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 
(1968). 
In this case, the value of the property which was stolen 
is an essential element of the prosecution's case. The 
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Defendant was charged with second degree felony theft under 
Utah Criminal Code, Sec. 76-6-412 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
establish second degree felony theft, the prosecution has to 
prove that the property stolen exceeded a value of $1,000. E 
evidence did not establish that value, Defendant should haw 
been acquitted of second degree felony theft. 
At trial, none of the physical evidence of the stolen 
property, the tools, the speaker, or the C. B. , were introduce( i 
into evidence. The only physical evidence before the jury 
identifying the stolen property were two 4x4 Polaroid 
photographs of poor quality which depicted only the speakers, 
C.B. headphones, antenna and the tool box (Tr. 93). The tools 
were not admitted into evidence, nor were they depicted bya 
photograph, even though they were significantly the most 
valuable items stolen. 
Where all the stolen property was not present at trial I 
Defendant did not have an opportunity to adequately 
cross-examine the Mr. Ashby, the State's only witness on value. 
with regard to the property's value, since the property in 
question was absent from the proceeding and was therefore not 
subject to observation and inspection. The jurors also could 
not examine the property to determine the weight they would givi 
to Mr. Ashby's testimony. Moreover, Defendant's expert witness 
could not most persuasively rebut the victim's testimony 
concerning property value where there was no property to 
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examine. This is especially critical in light of the testimony 
of Mr. Ashby that the stolen property was used, but in good or 
fair condition. Under these circumstances Defendant was denied 
his right to cross-examine and his right of confrontation was 
seriously undermined. 
The circumstances at trial do not evidence bad faith, or 
a deliberate suppression of evidence by the prosecution. This 
case is not cut from that cloth. See State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 
477 (Utah 1975). Defendant is contending, however, that because 
the stolen property was simply absent from the trial, he was 
effectively denied his right to cross-examine on the value of 
the property. 
This case is analogous to the case of State v. Havas, 
601P.2d1197 (Nev. 1979), where the defendant was charged with 
forcible rape. The defendant was convicted and appealed arguing 
that the failure to produce potentially relevant evidence at 
trial, the undergarments of the victim, violated his due process 
rights. There was no indication of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The garments were either lost, destroyed or simply not taken 
into possession. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
evidence was material, and that the failure of the prosecution 
to produce the material evidence violated the defendants due 
process rights without the necessity of showing the reason for 
its unavailability. 
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' 
Similarly, the evidence excluded from Mr. Ballengergt·i 
trial was clearly material. Its absence alone justifies 
reversal. 
This Court has expressed its policy to allow the ju::: 
the opportunity to view the property which was stolen in an 
effort to aid the jury in a determination of its value. In 
State v. Harris, 519 P.2d 247 (1974) this Court, in a case 
dealing with the fraudulent use of a credit card, stated: 
Value is something at which the jury may take a 
look. The owner of an article is competent as 
to its value, and such testimony is admissible, 
but neither inviolate or impervious to 
disbelief. The jury may take a view of the 
item for excellence or shoddiness and look 
through the same spectacles at the witness to 
determine the latter's imagination or 
credibility, -- and the verdict is its as to 
value. Id., at 248. 
See also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
Where the exclusion of relevant and material evidence 
seriously undermines defendant's right to confrontation and is 
directly related to an essential element of proof, the policy: 
this Court, as articulated in Harris should be followed. This 
Court should rule under the facts of this case that the jury 
should have had an opportunity to observe the actual physical 
evidence, and that the defendant should have had an opportunit: 
for meaningful cross-examination. Quite obviously, where~ 
is at issue, and the best evidence of value is not admitted in' 
evidence and is unavailable, defendant's opportunity for 
meaningful cross-examination has been severely undermined. 
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Accordingly, such circumstances so seriously impair defendant's 
right of confrontation that this Court should rule that he was 
accually denied said right and reverse his conviction. 
B. The evidence below was insufficient as a matter of 
law to support a conviction of second degree felony 
theft. 
At the close of prosecution's case, counsel for the 
Defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of 
the evidence (Tr. 145). The trial court denied this motion (Tr. 
14 5) . 
The standard required for the Defendant to successfuly 
overturn a verdict on the grounds of insufficiency of the 
evidence as stated in State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977), 
is that reasonable minds would not differ. This court stated: 
In order for the defendant to successfully 
challenge and overturn a verdict on the ground 
of insufficiency of the evidence, it must 
appear that upon viewing the evidence 
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. Id., at 68. 
See also State v. Mills, Utah 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975); State 
v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970) and State v. 
Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960). 
In the case at bar there was not sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury on the issue of second degree felony theft. The 
prosecution did not present physical evidence of all the 
property which was stolen. The only physical evidence, the two 
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Polaroid photographs, did not include any of the tools (Exh::, 
2-S, 4-S). According to the testimony of Mr. Ashby, these t: 
comprised the most valuable portion of the property taken, w:: 
a total cost to the victim of more than $1,800, with an 
estimated value of $1,300 (Tr. 94-100). 
Counsel for the Defendant introduced his expert to 
testify as to the value of the stolen tools (Tr. 193-195). 
These tools were not new but had been used by the Defendant C, 
96-100). Defendant's expert testified that the value of useo 
tools was significantly less than the new tools (Tr. 193-2161. 
But because the prosecution failed to produce the tools at 
trial, Defendant's expert was prevented from examining the 
tools. 
Where there is no physical evidence of the stolen tooi 
before the jury, the jury is left with only the item pictured. 
the Polaroid photographs, the CB, speaker, antenna and 
headphone. The value of items pictured in the Polaroid 
photographs, the CB, the speakers, the antenna and headphones:· 
Ashby's estimation amounted to $245 (Tr. 99-102), and is 
therefore insufficient to justify a verdict of second degree 1 
felony theft. 
While the owner of property may testify as to its valui I 
· and where that testimony is controverted by an expert witness, 
the testimony is on the value of used automatic tools, 
reasonable minds, could not determine that the value of the 
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tools exceeded the value determination made by Defendant's 
eipert. That being the case, the evidence was insufficient to 
convict for second degree felony theft. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional right of the people to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures is meaningful only if 
officers of the law are not given unfettered authority to 
intrude on the privacy of the individual on more than a mere 
whim or suspicion. Where an officer cannot articulate a 
suspicion, he should not be allowed to make an investigatory 
interrogation or stop. Where an officer does not have probable 
cause, he should not be allowed to make an arrest. Where an 
officer plans to seize property in the possession of another, he 
must have a warrant unless the exigencies of a situation justify 
an exception. Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more than 
substantial inarticulate hunches. 
Likewise, the right of trial by jury is meaningful only 
if the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the allegations of 
the prosecution. Where the defendant is denied the opportunity 
to cross examine, he is denied its right of confrontation. 
Where the physical evidence of the property stolen does not 
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amount to mandatory monetary value for second degree theft,: 
evidence is insufficient. 
Accordingly, where the evidence is obtained through;: 
improper investigatory interrogation, arrest, or an improper 
seizure, the evidence obtained thereby should be suppressed ar 
1 
the trial court determination reversed. In addition, wheret:[ 
I 
absence of relevant material physical evidence results in a ! 
denial of the right of confrontation or where the absence of 
physical evidence prevents the prosecution from proving a 
material element of its case, the conviction of the trial cou::[ 
should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
' I 
\/,1 
THURMAN & CONDI: 
(\ By._.,p=E=T=E~R~=~sT=r=R~B~A~~~~~ 
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